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Abstract
Academic freedom has often been defended in a progressivist manner: without aca-
demic freedom, creativity would be in peril, and with it the advancement of knowl-
edge, i.e. the epistemic progress in science. In this paper, I want to critically discuss 
the limits of such a progressivist defense of academic freedom, also known under 
the label ‘argument from truth.’ The critique is offered, however, with a constructive 
goal in mind, namely to offer an alternative account that connects creativity and aca-
demic freedom in a way that goes beyond mere reference to epistemic progress and 
involves reference to the freedom to think independently as the freedom we mean 
when we point to creativity and when we point to academic freedom. The result-
ing causal independence account is not only epistemologically stronger than a pro-
gressivist account, it also allows to counter the curbing of academic freedom in the 
name of progress. The latter becomes key, for instance, when authoritarian political 
regimes limit or negate academic freedom with reference to an epistemic progress 
suitably defined for that regime.
Keywords Creativity · Academic freedom · Originality · Spontaneity · Progress · 
Argument from truth · Critical thinking · Democracy · Authoritarian regimes
1 Introduction
In this paper, I will analyze the connection between creativity and academic freedom 
in a way that diverges from the usual way of linking them via the concept of pro-
gress. I will discuss creativity and academic freedom as two kinds of freedom that 
both refer to a causal independence of the mind. That independence is the freedom 
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we mean when we defend creativity and when we defend academic freedom. It can 
be realized as critical thinking (the freedom to criticize) and can but does not have to 
connect to progress.
The paper contributes to, and fruitfully combines insights from, two fields that 
have so far been rather isolated: discussions about creativity in science and art, in 
which academic freedom is rarely at issue, and contemporary discussions about aca-
demic freedom, in which creativity is frequently mentioned but in passing only.
The presented causal independence account of creativity and academic freedom 
allows, as I will show, for a more secure foundation for academic freedom than what 
the standard account and the progressivist justification built on it can offer. It is more 
secure not just from a conceptual and epistemological point of view, but also from a 
political point of view, since it also allows to counter those cases in which academic 
freedom is politically jeopardized in the name of progress. This is important since 
authoritarian political regimes can limit or even completely negate academic free-
dom with reference to a suitably defined epistemic progress for that regime. Hence, 
the relationship between academic freedom and epistemic progress is a double-
edged one. In the name of progress, one can argue for academic freedom, but also 
against it. This is the challenge that progressivist justifications of academic freedom 
face and it is the challenge that this contribution aims to answer by focusing on how 
creativity and academic freedom relate independently of the concept of progress, i.e. 
by asking what kind of freedom we mean when we talk about creativity and when 
we talk about academic freedom.
The core negative claim in this paper is: if progressivist defenses of academic 
freedom leave out the freedom to criticize, then they are not sufficiently equipped 
to protect academic freedom against such attacks. The core positive claim is that 
we can decouple the defense of academic freedom from reference to progress since 
the freedom we mean when we talk about creativity or academic freedom is in both 
cases a specific kind of causal independence that can be realized in the freedom to 
criticize.
After showing in Sect. 1 what creativity is, and thereby how it connects to freedom 
in general, I will discuss in Sect. 2 how academic freedom – as standardly conceived 
– relates to creativity and progress. This will provide the bits needed to argue for the 
negative claim. Section 3 uses these results to argue for the positive claim, namely a 
separate, non-progressivist justification for academic freedom and, simultaneously, a 
suitably improved progressivist defense, built on an augmented concept of academic 
freedom, augmented with the core of creativity – independent thinking.
The resulting account and defense of academic freedom, linking it to causal inde-
pendence, is in three senses better than the standard account of academic freedom 
and the progressivist defense built on it. First, the causal independence account 
does not rely on any progressivist thought. It is, second, epistemologically better 
grounded as it depicts the kind of freedom at issue more appropriately than the 
standard account of academic freedom, and thus describes the connection to creativ-
ity more appropriately. It is, third, a politically more robust account in the sense that 
it is a more effective argumentative barrier against those who challenge academic 
freedom in practice, e.g. in the name of a suitably defined progress, as part of which 
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those that are deemed to criticize the respective kind of progress are silenced, or 
have to seek exile in order to survive as academics.
1.1  Creativity requires partial independence from already existing knowledge
1.1.1  Standard accounts of creativity refer to originality and spontaneity
Most accounts of creativity will assume that it requires originality, spontaneity and 
adequacy.1 To justify calling an act, process or product creative, it needs to be origi-
nal (new), spontaneously produced (rather than routinely), and adequate (producing 
something of value, e.g. for a problem at hand). Since adequacy is a criterion that is 
also used for non-creative problem solutions, we are left with originality and spon-
taneity as the specific hallmarks of creativity. As the following will show, originality 
and spontaneity are also crucial to answer the following core question: what kinds of 
freedom are involved when scientists are creative?2
1.1.2  Originality as a kind of freedom
An act, process or product is original if something new is produced. The assumed 
contrast is that of learning from others. The difficult question has always been: ‘new’ 
in which sense? Is it creative, when somebody produces a new token of ceramic pots 
in a way that is typical in a certain population? Since it is creating something new 
(and of value, let’s assume), creating a new token of a typical item of culture can 
indeed be regarded as creative. I call the kind of novelty involved anthropological 
novelty (see Kronfeldner, 2009). Creativity thus understood relates to a basic anthro-
pological insight: humans are culture-producing animals. Yet, calling any culture-
producing behavior creative means using a very broad concept of creativity, one 
according to which every one of us will be creative most of the times.
When creativity in arts and sciences is at issue, as in this analysis, the implicitly 
assumed concept of creativity is, however, narrower. The novelty at issue is some-
times even restricted to historical novelty, to ‘being the first one.’ If so, then only 
those who did something for the very first time in history are taken to be creative. At 
issue is the kind of historical creativity that the ‘hero books of science or art’ utilize 
to tell their streamlined super(wo)men success stories. Yet, the utilized perspective 
results in a too narrow concept of creativity since what is most commonly regarded 
as creative in arts and sciences is not what is objectively new in history, but what is 
subjectively new: new in somebody’s psychological history, i.e. unlearned.3
In my view, the most important point of distinguishing between historical and 
psychological novelty is the following: when psychological creativity is at issue, 
then it is not the objective existence of an original that takes away originality but 
1 See for instance, the prominent accounts of Sternberg and Lubart (1999: 3) or Boden (2004: 1).
2 The following argumentation in this Sect. 1 is based on my previous research on creativity. For more 
details, see Kronfeldner (2009, 2011, 2018).
3 See also Boden (2004: 43–8) for the contrast between historical and psychological creativity.
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a specific causal relation to that original. What is at issue in attributing originality 
(and with it creativity) is whether one’s mind was directly influenced by the respec-
tive original, i.e. whether one learned and thus copied the respective activity from 
an original or a person producing the original. Only if the origin of what one does 
is in oneself (rather than elsewhere) can originality be attributed to oneself. It fol-
lows that, in the context of arts and sciences, originality can be attributed if and only 
if psychological novelty can be attributed, i.e. when something is at the moment 
of creation new for the creative individual (rather than learned and reproduced). 
Certainly, in order to have one’s own originality compromised by an original, there 
needs to be such an original, but the fact that there is an original is not sufficient for 
it to be compromising.
The primacy of psychological novelty for attributing originality rests on an 
important asymmetry, namely: while every historical novelty must have been a psy-
chological novelty, the converse does not hold. Not every psychological novelty is 
a historical novelty. This asymmetry only comes into view when one connects the 
novelty criterion back to causal processes.
In sum, anthropological novelty would be too broad and historical novelty too 
narrow to capture what is usually meant by originality if creativity in arts and sci-
ences is at issue. By comparing different kinds of novelties, we also saw that crea-
tivity requires a specific kind of freedom, namely a causal independence from what 
others have done in the past.4 Originality is a kind of freedom, a kind of freedom 
that is strictly necessary for creativity since it relates to what creativity is. It is a kind 
of freedom that we mean when we talk about creativity.
1.1.3  Spontaneity as a similar kind of freedom
Spontaneity refers to a similar kind of causal independence relation, just one within 
the creative individual. The contrast standardly used is routine method. If a person 
routinely produces something (a theory, a piece of art, etc.), then we usually do not 
call that act creative, even though we might call it productive. It is too dull a pro-
cess to get the dignifying label ‘creative’.5 In the standard discourses on creativity 
in arts and sciences, creativity is attributed only if the creative person has no routine 
(i.e. mechanical) control over a production process, i.e. if there is insight, surprise 
and some unpredictability involved. This narrow usage of the concept of creativity 
stems from creativity’s phenomenology. It points to what it is like to be creative. 
One finds that phenomenology in countless (self-)reports, e.g. in the famous story 
4 In philosophical analysis of creativity it is quite common to take creativity as a kind of freedom. Often, 
however, that happens with reference to metaphysical freedom, an idea that I criticized in Kronfeldner 
(2009) since the freedom referred to can be naturalized as an independence from certain causal influ-
ences (contrasted with metaphysical freedom, i.e. an independence from causal determination as such).
5 In contexts outside of arts and sciences, the label ‘creative’ is clearly more liberally applied to all kinds 
of activities that do not fit a pre-fixed description or constraints of sorts. E.g. when ‘free’-lancers are 
called ‘creative’ this simply means that they are mostly left in a precarious situation, free to suffer the 
social ills that emancipatory political activities try to reduce by defending constraints on how ‘freelanc-
ers’ have to be treated in terms of social security and the like.
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of Archimedes shouting Eureka! at the moment when he suddenly realized how to 
solve the problem he was busy with: the problem of measuring the volume of an 
irregular solid form (such as a crown), in order to verify the material it is made of. 
He solved the problem, as the report goes, in the moment in which he lowered his 
very own irregular solid body into a Roman bathtube, noticing that the water spilled 
over the bathtube, and suddenly he got it: Eureka! Below, I will use the story of 
Kekulé, who (as his story goes) suddenly realized, after dreaming about snakes, how 
to solve the problem of the structure of the chemical compound benzene. But such 
Eureka experiences are not only to be found in often self-told stories; they also show 
up in the experiments of psychologists, who call it insight: the sudden spark of men-
tal illumination, often following a stage of longer incubation.
Philosophically, this suddenness of insight can be conceptualized as a form of 
spontaneity. This is because one can raise one’s arm by the power of one’s will, but 
one cannot come up with an idea for a problem that demands a creative solution 
simply by the power of one’s will. I assume that a freedom that operates without the 
command of the will is fittingly called ‘spontaneous.’
Imagine you invented your very own technique of how to make ceramic pots; 
and now you make a numerically new pot using this technique. In such a moment, 
you are not performing a creative act in the narrow sense assumed here; you simply 
follow a routine, even if it is your very own routine. At that moment, you might be 
original (because the origin of that technique is in your mind rather than in someone 
else’s mind), but you are not creative in the narrow sense. Spontaneity is missing. 
It is all too routine-like. This is why originality is not sufficient for creativity in the 
narrow sense assumed here. Spontaneity is necessary too.
Let me illustrate this point with the case of the German chemist Friedrich A. 
Kekulé (1829–1896), who revolutionized chemistry with his solution for the puz-
zle of how to specify the molecular structure of the chemical compound benzene. 
Reporting on his discovery, he described how he fell asleep and had the following 
dream:
“I turned my chair to the fire and dozed […] Again the atoms were gambol-
ing before my eyes. This time the smaller groups kept modestly in the back-
ground. My mental eye, rendered more acute by repeated visions of this kind, 
could now distinguish larger structures, of manifold conformation; long rows, 
sometimes more closely fitted together; all twining and twisting in snake-like 
motion. But look! What was that? One of the snakes had seized hold of its own 
tail, and the form whirled mockingly before my eyes. As if by a flash of light-
ning I awoke.” (Quoted after Findlay, 1968: 34-41; 39).
If the report is correct, then this dream was Kekulé’s moment of insight that ben-
zene forms a ring rather than a linear string, building with that the foundations of 
organic chemistry.6 There is evidence that Kekulé was skilled in visual imagination, 
6 Historians like Rudofsky and Wotiz (1988) have accumulated some evidence that the report is not cor-
rect. One should thus treat the case as an illustrative example, as a hypothetical paradigmatic example of 
what we mean when we talk about creativity.
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which might have been influenced by the fact that he studied architecture before 
he became a chemist. In addition, Kekulé might have been subject to some visual 
impressions (e.g. visiting a zoo, visiting a dance performance) that influenced him 
when he visualized benzene in the way he reports. Yet, these causal influences (if 
they were operative, which we will never find out) do not make him less creative, 
i.e. they do not take away originality and spontaneity. How come? Because these 
influences have nothing to do with benzene molecules. If the story is correct, then 
his visual imagination was influenced by factors that come from outside of the con-
text. Kekulé’s previous knowledge and his goal-orientedness to find a solution to 
the problem of the structure of benzene made it likely that he will find the solution, 
but his very own previously acquired knowledge and his goal-orientation were not 
sufficient for him to actually find the solution. He needed some inspiration – not out-
of-nothing metaphysically, but rather out-of-nothing relative to the problem-space 
he was dealing with. Such a relativized ‘out-of-nothing’ influence can account for 
the psychological originality and spontaneity involved. Given standard philosophi-
cal terminology, the causal influences that were involved in the emergence of his 
idea about benzene forming a ring are so-called coincidental influences. Coinci-
dences account for surprise and practical unpredictability, an unpredictability not in 
any metaphysical sense, but an unpredictability for the creative subject as well as for 
other cognizers in the situation.
That creativity requires spontaneity in the specified sense does not mean that there 
is no goal-directedness involved. Creativity can happen without any goal (i.e. with-
out a problem to solve in mind), as in cases of so-called true serendipity, and it can 
happen with a goal in mind. The latter can take place as part of pseudo-serendipity 
or as part of trial-and-error problem solving.7 In cases of true serendipity, one is not 
looking for a solution to a problem. One only recognizes something as a solution 
to a problem, i.e. one takes something to be a problem to be solved, at the moment 
one recognizes the solution to it. In cases of pseudo-serendipity, there is a perceived 
problem before the solution comes up, but there is no active search for the solution 
by producing trials. One simply comes across a solution while looking for it. If there 
is intentional production of trials, then it is trial-and-error problem solving. But even 
here the command of the will might not suffice to find the solution. Hence creativity 
is not opposed to goal-orientedness; it is just that goal-orientedness is neither neces-
sarily part of the situation nor sufficient for finding a solution. The finding of the 
solution ‘happens’ to the problem solver.8
In sum, spontaneity amounts to the absence of foresight and the absence of con-
trol over the process of generating a solution. This means that creativity is opposed 
to routine production and technique (i.e. method). Viewed from an abstract point of 
view, spontaneity can be conceptualized as a causal independence from one’s own 
previously acquired knowledge. That this is so is not just part of the phenomenology 
of creativity, it is part of what we mean when we use the concept of creativity in the 
7 See Roberts (1989), who introduced these distinctions, and Kronfeldner (2011: 38–41) for details and 
examples.
8 Compare Gaut (2009), for more on how goal-directedness and creativity connect.
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narrow sense in which it is used in arts and sciences. As with originality, it is thus 
conceptually necessary that creativity involves that specific kind of freedom.
1.1.4  Summary: The freedoms we mean
Both originality and spontaneity can be fulfilled in degrees and point at a specific 
kind of freedom, a partial causal independence from already existing knowledge – in 
others (originality) or in oneself (spontaneity). This means:
a) Originality amounts to a partial independence from the causal influence of an 
original, i.e. the already acquired knowledge in others.
b) Spontaneity amounts to a partial independence from the causal influence of previ-
ously acquired knowledge in oneself.
Given that the concept of creativity in arts and sciences is at issue, the resulting 
connection between freedom and creativity is the following: originality and sponta-
neity entail a partial causal independence from already existing knowledge, which is 
a kind of freedom that is necessary for creativity. It is a freedom we mean when we 
talk about creativity.
Yet, that kind of freedom is not equivalent to how academic freedom is standardly 
conceived. As I will show in Part 2, this is also why academic freedom as standardly 
conceived is not necessary for creativity. Part 3 then will use the concept of causal 
independence to augment the concept of academic freedom to point at how creativ-
ity and academic freedom actually relate, which shows that academic freedom can 
be defended quite irrespective of any progressivist commitments.
2  Why academic freedom as standardly conceived is not necessary 
for creativity
In the following, I will review important limitations that a strong and a weak version 
of the progressivist justification of academic freedom face if they are based on a 
concept of academic freedom as standardly conceived.
2.1  Academic freedom as standardly conceived
Academic freedom is an important freedom with a quite broad scope with respect 
to the liberties it guarantees practically. It includes not only the freedom to make 
specific scientific claims, but also the freedom of selecting topics and methods for 
research, the freedom to decide about the duration of research and the evaluation 
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of the results, as well as the freedom to decide about their publication.9 In terms of 
philosophical conceptions of freedom, it can be portrayed as two-sided:
– Academic freedom entails negative freedom from infringement, with respect to all 
kinds of authorities (academic, religious, political, economic, etc.). This aspect is part 
of most accounts of academic freedom as well as part of most legislations.
– Sometimes it is added that academic freedom also entails positive freedoms, 
i.e. the presence of enabling conditions to exercise one’s freedom, usually with 
respect to the duty of governments and universities to support the free research.
Hence, as standardly conceived, the term ‘academic freedom’ refers to the absence 
of disabling conditions and sometimes to the presence of enabling conditions.10
Depending on context, the bearers of ‘academic freedom’ are individual research-
ers (as in the context of discussion of this paper) or the community of research-
ers represented by respective collectives (e.g. science foundations that distribute 
public funding in a self-governed manner, independent of influences from govern-
ments or other political or economic interests). Sometimes, the discussion switches 
completely to the institutional level, i.e. to the autonomy of universities or similar 
institutions.11
The taxonomy of traditional justifications for the thus conceived academic free-
dom is usually tripartite.
– Arguments from autonomy refer to personal autonomy of individuals as compro-
mised if academic freedom is not respected.
– Arguments from democracy point at the function of academic institutions to fos-
ter open and democratic societies.
9 Usually, these freedoms encompass matters of research and teaching. In this paper, the focus is on 
research. In addition, if the context of discussion relates to the legal status and protection of employees, 
then further freedoms are often added, e.g. the freedom to criticize superiors without retribution, the 
freedom to decide how to spend one’s work time, etc. See Barendt (2010) on this more legal dimension.
10 That two-sidedness is directly mirrored in legislation, e.g. in how the granted freedom is legally inter-
preted. For instance, the German legislation (among the strongest in terms of protecting academic free-
dom) protects academic freedom as part of Germany’s Basic Law (Grundgesetz) (Article 5, 3). Details 
are specified in the respective Higher Education Laws (Hochschulgesetze), e.g. in the 2006 Bavarian 
Higher Education Law (BayHSchG), in which the first sentence of Article 3 mentions the duty of the 
government and of universities to enable what is protected by the Basic law, and the second sentence 
specifies the scope of that protection (basically as portrayed above). For details on these issues, see 
Barendt (2010).
11 Apart from these general points, not much agreement exists on the concept of academic freedom 
(what it means, what its scope is), which is mirrored in issues and disagreements about how to measure 
it. See, for instance, Fish (2014), on five different accounts of what academic freedom entails in prac-
tice. Differences in the accounts that Fish presents depend mostly on how to interpret the function of 
‘academics’ in society and on how science and politics should connect. See Matei and Iwinska (2018) 
for review of how academic freedom is measured in the European Higher Education Area, in order to 
monitor it in practice. They not only refer to the evidence about diversity of meanings between different 
cultural contexts, but also to diverging paths of academic freedom at the individual level on the one hand, 
and institutional autonomy (the freedom of academic institutions such as universities) on the other hand.
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– Arguments from truth refer to the claim that without academic freedom there will 
be no progress in matters of truth.
The labels used for these justifications in the growing literature on academic free-
dom differ, and some authors mention only a subset of them.12 One representative 
example has to suffice, given the space available here. Dworkin (1998), for instance, 
discusses only the last two, but can be interpreted to use a combination of the first 
two under the label “ethical individualism,” the principle that, according to him, 
grounds the overall justification of academic freedom. Finally, for the aims of this 
paper, it is also important to note that the first two are often taken to be ethical or 
political, while the third is taken to be epistemological.
The rest of Sect. 2 will discuss the third, the argument from truth (henceforth: progres-
sivist justification), by revisiting specific claims made about creativity and academic free-
dom (taken to lead to epistemic progress). To do so, I will distinguish between a strong and 
a weak version of the progressivist justification and show the limits of both. Section 3 will 
then open a way to reconnect the ethical and political side with the epistemological side 
in a way that solves the issues that arise from the limitations of the claims reviewed in 
Sect. 2, resulting in an augmented concept of academic freedom, an outlook for a new non-
progressivist justification of it, and even an improved progressivist justification.
2.2  A strong and a weak version of the progressivist justification
Progressivist justifications of academic freedom have been used in different versions 
ever since J. S. Mill raised the issue of freedom of thought in his On Liberty (1859), 
and even before – for instance, in John Milton’s Areopagitica (1644). In contem-
porary literature, they are mounted on the assumption that it is the function of aca-
demic research (and the institutions in which it happens) to advance knowledge, i.e. 
to produce epistemic progress.13
The progressivist justification exists in two versions, a strong and a weak one. 
Michael Polanyi (1951) can be interpreted as having defended a strong version of 
it, and he does so with explicit reference to creativity, which is why I have cho-
sen him as an example to illustrate the progressivist point of view. Polanyi claimed 
that science combines two seemingly contradictory principles: the ideal scholar is 
12 Compare Andreescu (2009), whose terminology I more or less follow, with Wilholt (2012), who uses 
the same line-up but different labels. Other divides are certainly possible. Barendt (2010: 53–63), for 
instance, distinguishes between consequentialist and deontological versions of the third, the argument 
from truth. Only his consequentialist version of the argument from truth is at issue here; his deontologi-
cal versions relate the search for truth to the argument from autonomy or democracy. These three refer-
ences can also serve as entry points to the overall body of literature on the topic, with Andreescu con-
necting things to higher education studies, Wilholt to philosophy of science, and Barendt to legal studies.
13 See Post (2006) on how this relates to the history of how institutions of higher education in the US 
have only gradually incorporated this function. See Barendt (2010) on how this relates to other contexts, 
in particular Great Britain and Germany, where not just the legal context differed and still differs but also 
the history of higher education and how it connects to research and its function to advance knowledge.
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simultaneously creative and disciplined. That means, the ideal scholar enjoys full 
creative freedom and is simultaneously fully “dedicated to the service of a trans-
cendent reality” (ibid.: 584), and in that sense disciplined, devoted to that reality and 
the truths about it.14 Given these two simultaneous orientations of the ideal scholar 
and given the social structure of academic research (the cooperation between schol-
ars), progress regarding truth can happen and regularly does happen, but only if aca-
demic freedom is granted. In his account, the “efforts” of scholars.
“will be efficiently co-ordinated if only each is left to follow his own inclina-
tions. It is claimed in fact that there is no other efficient way of organizing the 
team, and that any attempt to coordinate their efforts by directives of a supe-
rior authority would inevitably destroy the effectiveness of their cooperation.” 
(Polanyi, 1951: 34, emph. added).
The effectiveness he means is progress regarding truth (epistemic progress). From that 
it follows that reality is the only authority scholars should take into account, and that “[a]
ny intervention on the part of an outside authority could only destroy their contact with the 
aims which they are pledged to pursue” (ibid.: 40), namely aims that relate to epistemic 
progress. He claims that in the short run such outside interventions lead to “distortion” and 
in the long run to “more or less complete destruction of the tradition of science” (ibid.: 57).
Claiming that without academic freedom epistemic progress would be destroyed, 
combined with the claim that academic freedom is the only efficient way to organize 
science, means that academic freedom is taken as necessary for creativity, innova-
tion and thus progress in science. That is quite a strong claim.
The weaker version of combining academic freedom and epistemic progress (and 
thus a weaker interpretation of Polanyi) would be the claim that without academic 
freedom, epistemic progress would be much harder to achieve, a claim that is more 
akin to Mill’s original version (as I will show below). The claim would then be that 
the long-term progress towards more and more truths is not destroyed but hindered if 
academic freedom is absent; the resulting system of science would be less efficient.
It would be a matter of in-depth textual examination to clarify whether Polanyi 
really meant to defend a strong version, which can be criticized rather easily (as I 
will show below). This interpretative historical question is beyond the scope of this 
article. All that I want to claim is that Polanyi can be interpreted in that way and 
as such he represents a standard way of putting things; so standard in fact that it is 
often rather briefly put. One example has to suffice: Barendt (2010: 57), for instance, 
summarizes the progressivist justification as asserting “that academic freedom is 
necessary to enable university professors and teachers to advance human knowledge 
through conducting research, publishing their findings and communicating them 
14 For instrumentalists in philosophy of science (and I count myself as leaning towards instrumentalism) 
this is clearly the wrong start, but for the purposes of this paper it does not matter whether realism or 
instrumentalism is the assumed framework for defending a progressivist justification for academic free-
dom.
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to students in lectures and seminars.”15 Epistemic progress is here defined as the 
advancement of knowledge, i.e. the discovery of new truths.
I will not indulge in any further textual interpretation, neither for classic accounts 
like Polanyi, nor for contemporary accounts that involve necessity claims. I will 
rather follow a systematic route. As part of that, I will use the strong version as a 
wetting stone (since it is so easily refuted, a ‘straw man’ as we sometimes say), but 
with a specific constructive intention in mind: to guide the reader through, from the 
strong version to the weaker version, in order to clarify what can be defended in 
each. As we will see, it is not much, but reviewing it is vital to find the common core 
between creativity and academic freedom, which will be the topic of Sect. 3.
2.3  Against the strong version of the progressivist justification
In the strong version of the progressivist justification, academic freedom is portrayed as 
necessary for creativity, innovation and progress: if academic freedom is not guaranteed, 
new truths will not be discovered, i.e. no creativity will happen. As mentioned, this is 
clearly too strong. I will show this not by going into the details of the history of the pro-
gressivist justification for academic freedom,16 but on the basis of a case-based refutation. 
At issue, then, is what follows from this refutation with respect to how creativity and aca-
demic freedom relate. I will analyze the latter by adding insights from creativity research.
The necessity claim in the strong version of the progressivist justification is easily 
proven wrong, simply by the existence of innovations that resulted from constraints 
and guidance, if not pressure. There is an abundance of government-, military-, 
or industry-funded cases (take the internet, for instance, which originated from a 
military context) that led to epistemic progress even though academic freedom was 
limited if not absent. If choice of topic is influenced by governments via provid-
ing more funds for certain topics than for others, academic freedom is already a bit 
limited, but not absent as long the positions of the researchers are not at peril should 
the researchers ignore that ‘nudge’. Academic freedom is absent if topic choice, 
research methods, duration of the research, evaluation and publication of results is to 
a large extent or completely determined from outside, as it is often (not always) the 
case in military contexts and contemporary industry contexts, as part of which the 
research is ‘directed’.17 As Guston (2000) reports, looking back at different systems 
16 For the history of defending a progressivist justification, before and after Mill, see Wilholt (2012).
17 It is certainly not the case that industry-, military- and government-contexts automatically prevent 
academic freedom due to their respective goal-orientedness. It depends on which model of research pro-
ductivity is used. Directly after the Second World War, the so-called ‘linear model’ of research fund-
ing dominated. Bush’s (1945) Science: The Endless Frontier counts as the landmark of that model. It 
assumed that if and only if you grant positive and negative academic freedom, innovation will result. It 
utilizes the same necessity relation between academic freedom and progress that we discussed above, 
15 Further quotes could be added. Barendt (2010: 51), for instance, also reports that “traditionally” the 
“distinctive task” of universities has been specified as “the methodological discovery and teaching of 
truths about serious and important things. Professors, lecturers and researchers enable universities to dis-
charge these special responsibilities, it is argued, only if they enjoy the academic freedom to discover and 
transmit knowledge of the truths of their discipline.” (emph. added).
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of research funding in major areas since the Second World War (e.g. in the United 
States of America, Great Britain, Japan, Germany), some granted freedom was in 
vain since it was not sufficient for the respective progress and sometimes pressure 
and constraints were quite productive ‘mothers of invention.’
On the basis of that history, it seems to be by now common sense in science pol-
icy that creativity does not always happen even if freedom is granted (academic free-
dom not being sufficient), and if creativity happens it can happen without academic 
freedom (academic freedom not being necessary). If so, if academic freedom is nei-
ther necessary nor sufficient for creativity, what, then, is the relationship between 
creativity and academic freedom?
Before I can provide an answer in Sect. 3, it is worthwhile to briefly deepen our 
account of this result by analyzing why academic freedom fails to be necessary for 
creativity. The above-mentioned existence claims, after all, do not entail a reply to 
this question. Some counterfactual scenarios combined with insights from the psy-
chology of creativity can help in that respect. Recall Kekulé’s story. Was it nec-
essary that he had academic freedom for his discovery that benzene forms a ring, 
opposing thereby the ‘dogma’ (conventional truth of the time) that molecules of that 
kind can only form linear strings? The following will illustrate that it was not, nei-
ther with respect to positive freedom nor with respect to negative freedom.
Imagine a counterfactual scenario in which Kekulé, at the time of his discovery, 
was a young scientist striving for a secure position. An authority – be it academic, 
religious, political or economic – told him that he would not get a permanent posi-
tion or any further funds if he does not find a solution to the important chemical 
problem about the structure of benzene. That ‘pressure’ and negation of positive 
academic freedom would very likely have had effects, including effects on Kekulé’s 
creativity. Yet, these effects could have been either negative or positive. As men-
tioned, sometimes ‘necessity’ in the sense of a pressure of having to find a solution 
is the ‘mother of invention’, nudging creativity on; at other times, pressure and con-
straints will stifle creativity. It all depends on the details. Jon Elster (2000) tried to 
account for this two-sidedness of the relationship between pressure, constraints and 
creativity and claimed that there is a U-shaped relation: too much pressure (left side 
of the U) harms creativity, some pressure is productive (bottom of the U), while too 
much freedom is detrimental (right side of the U). This two-sidedness of the effects 
of pressure on the one hand and freedom on the other hand confirms the above-
mentioned consensus: positive academic freedom (as conventionally defined) is not 
necessary for creativity; it can hamper it too if it is too much. What remains is nei-
ther necessity, nor a positive correlation that has ‘more creativity, if more positive 
freedom’. All that remains, is a U-shaped relation. The rest – the right amount and 
Footnote 17 (continued)
which leads (because of the simultaneous sufficiency claim) to a linear path from academic freedom to 
useful innovations—from free, non-instrumental, basic science to targeted, instrumental, applied innova-
tions for the respective context (see Ziman 2003, for details). There is now a broad consensus that the 
linear model is wrong. Varma (1995) therefore contrasts the linear “autonomous” model that dominated 
in the USA directly after the Second World War, with what she calls “linkage” model, as part of which 
researchers are ‘on a leash’, tightly controlled. According to her, since around the 1980s the linkage 
model took over the USA industry’s research funding.
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the right kind of support and pressure that is productive in a specific setting – is in 
the legendary ‘devil’s details.’
But what about creativity and negative academic freedom? It seems that this is 
the easier case for defending that academic freedom is necessary for creativity. Let’s 
imagine this time that an authority – again, be it academic, religious, political, or 
economic – told Kekulé that he would end up in dire straits (e.g. in prison) if he 
defends anything else than the received view that organic molecules form a linear 
string. The crucial point is that more severe ‘pressure’ and ‘interference’ (related not 
just to the absence of enabling conditions but the presence of disabling conditions) 
would still not have necessarily taken away his creativity since creativity is first and 
foremost cognitive. He could still have come up with the idea. And maybe he would 
have been even more likely to arrive at his revolutionary idea, given the pressure. He 
might have thought: ‘If the authorities are so afraid of the dogma being criticized, 
maybe there is something to gain from questioning it; maybe that rule of linearity 
is the stumbling block of why I cannot find a solution.’ In psychological creativity 
research, such a sudden questioning of a foundational background assumption that 
frames the search for a solution is called Gestalt switch. It is taken to explain at least 
part of the spontaneity in creative cognition.18 Certainly, the mentioned pressure can 
also stifle creativity, e.g. by creating so much fear that serious creative thought is 
indeed becoming impossible. In addition, it can easily prevent (if the threat is suc-
cessful) that creativity leads to epistemic progress. After all, creativity is clearly not 
sufficient for epistemic progress. For the latter, there needs to be uptake and for that 
ideas need to circulate. The circulation of new ideas can very efficiently be stifled 
if there is no academic freedom. Censorship has indeed been used in history exten-
sively by diverse authorities. But censorship refers to the circulation of ideas, not the 
origination of ideas. In a censorship context, you can have the ideas; it is just that 
you are not allowed to spread them.
To sum up: at the psychological level of creativity, it appears that new truths can 
emerge in individual minds, even if there is no positive and no negative academic 
freedom. It is not even clear that there is a tendency toward more creativity in situ-
ations of full freedom since too much freedom can hinder creativity, as I explained 
above. Thus, academic freedom is neither necessary for creativity as a cognitive 
phenomenon nor always productive. However, as I have shown in Sect. 1, originality 
and spontaneity are necessary for creativity. But – and here’s the rub – these kinds 
of freedom are not the same as academic freedom, at least as academic freedom is 
standardly defined, namely as discussed in this Section. This will be important for 
Sect. 3, where I will try to superimpose these different kinds of freedom to bring to 
the fore their common core. But before we can go there, the weaker version of the 
progressivist justification needs to be addressed since that is what critics will point 
to in reply to what I said so far on the relationship between constraints and creativity.
18 See Öllinger et al. (2013), for instance, for a contemporary defense of the tradition going back to the 
Gestalt psychologist’s account of creativity.
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2.4  Problems of the weak version of the progressivist justification for academic 
freedom
There is one option left to secure a positive correlation, even if the above is taken for 
granted. At a populational and thus historical level (i.e. all individual researchers or 
groups of them taken together), academic freedom might still be positively corre-
lated with creativity, giving credence to the claim that the absence of academic free-
dom can hinder scientific progress, making science less efficient. There seems to be 
a broad consensus about that claim being true, at least as a prima-facie hypothesis. 
Leiter (2018: 33), for instance, writes that the “central rationale for academic free-
dom in the Western universities has always been that such freedom makes discovery 
of the truth more likely,” deriving this claim, as so many, from the authority of J. S. 
Mill’s version of the progressivist justification of academic freedom. Yet, the situa-
tion is less promising if one looks at the evidence that could justify the confidence 
that this classic claim is true.
To validate it, one would have to go beyond thought experiments, psychologi-
cal insights, or anecdotal evidence from history (kinds of evidence or reasons that I 
myself used above). Yet, when people refer to a population-level correlation of aca-
demic freedom and epistemic progress, as Kitcher (2004) already mentioned, they 
do so often “from the armchair,” with “a few bits of anecdotal evidence” only, “hav-
ing read a book on Lysenkoism and a biography of Einstein.” As he continues, “[i]n 
fact, little is known in any systematic way about the responsiveness of scientific 
research to social directives.” (Kitcher, 2004: 56; 2011: 119)19 After all, the method 
of cases (used for generating counterexamples, as I have done above) works only 
if you want to falsify a specific claim; for inductive inferences to support a statisti-
cal correlation at a populational level, evidence from a few cases, and the existence 
claims resulting from them, simply do not suffice.
The problem is that it is rather unlikely that one can go beyond existence claims 
since it is hard to imagine how to study that correlation empirically, with a convinc-
ing solution to sampling of the cases, replication, etc. After all, everyone can make 
her or his own garden-variety list of innovations that relied on autonomous science 
and contrast it with another list that relied on some kind of pressure.
To illustrate: Basalla (1988), for instance, defended in his famous evolutionary 
account of technological change that need or pressure does not always drive cultural 
change. To infer, however, that innovation is not often oriented at needs, as Mesoudi 
(2008: 249) seems to interpret Basalla, is overstating the case. ‘Often’ is a suspi-
ciously vague qualifier, in this case thrown in for good measure. To be convincing, 
it needs backing-up by systematic empirical evidence, quantifying the ‘often’ with a 
well-justified selection of cases.
It follows that it is hard to say, in general, what kind of innovation is more fre-
quent and under which conditions exactly. We might be able to historically or coun-
terfactually study specific settings, for instance, how innovative the contemporary 
US Science and Higher Education Area is compared to the contemporary European 
19 See Wilholt (2012: 169) for a similar point.
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equivalent, which is what most empirical research in innovation studies does. How-
ever, generalization to an overall correlation of academic freedom with innovative-
ness will be beyond the reach of such studies. This is because in addition to issues 
about sampling, it is still the case that measuring the two core variables – academic 
freedom on the one hand, and the success of science (epistemic progress) on the 
other hand – is quite a contested affair, and highly context-dependent, which makes 
it unlikely that meta-studies are solving the problem.
As mentioned, sufficient systematic evidence seems to be unavailable for the case 
at issue; neither the psychologists in their labs, nor the economists, sociologists or 
historians in their field of actual history of science and technology can provide it in 
the form necessary. I conclude that the evidence that is and can realistically be avail-
able only allows for the following: first, existence claims (i.e. innovation exists with 
and without academic freedom being fully granted); second, empirically backed-up 
claims about some rough patterns (e.g. Elster’s U-shaped relation between pressure 
and creativity); third, some contextual insights (e.g. regarding differences between 
the US area directly after the Second World War and since the 1980s).
Before I summarize, a note on Mill needs to be added: Mill’s famous chapter on 
The Liberty of Thought and Discussion in On Liberty (1859) can be interpreted to 
provide a defense of the population level correlation between progress, creativity 
and academic freedom as standardly conceived. His argument is interesting, histori-
cally as well as philosophically, but this paper cannot do full justice to it. This is so 
since the argument Mill provides is not based on a well-selected set of cases that 
grounds an empirical confirmation of a generalization. It rather refers to an invisible- 
hand mechanism of selection, akin to natural selection. The claim is that truth (like 
a biological adaptation) will automatically win against falsity in the long run, but 
only if freedom of thought and expression is provided. This claim is based on the 
assumption that there is an asymmetry in the probabilities in which truths and falsi-
ties reappear, which, I think, is unfortunately very often simply wrong. Yet, to probe 
that assumption in detail (why it is so often wrong; and, with that, why the ‘free 
market of ideas’ so often fails to reliably produce epistemic prosperity) has to wait 
for another occasion.
2.5  Summary of what’s the problem with the progressivist justification
Since basic assumptions need to be probed further and since a lot of historical, 
social and psychological evidence needs to be accumulated to really confirm that 
academic freedom is generally positively correlated with creativity, and since that 
kind of evidence is hard to get, I conclude the following: connecting academic free-
dom and creativity the way the weak version of the progressivist justification does is 
not necessarily wrong but it is not a very secure foundation for defending academic 
freedom.
Section 3 will offer an account of academic freedom that is more secure since 
it directly connects academic freedom with the kinds of freedom that are indeed 
necessary for creativity – namely, originality and spontaneity. That way it will 
also be possible to suggest an independent, non-progressivist epistemic defense of 
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academic freedom and, simultaneously, to suggest improvements for the progressiv-
ist justification.
3  The causal independence account: A richer way to conceptualize 
academic freedom
The guiding idea in the following is that the concept of academic freedom as stand-
ardly conceived is under-specified. It needs to be augmented – with a reference to 
causal independence as the freedom we mean when we talk about creativity and 
when we talk about academic freedom. This will provide the looked-after close con-
nection between creativity and academic freedom. A progressivist justification can 
profit from this connection, but the connection also reorients the focus to something 
else than epistemic progress. As a result, a non-progressivist epistemic defense of 
academic freedom comes into view.
3.1  Creativity and thinking independently
Recall our second counterfactual Kekulé story, in which an authority told Kekulé 
that he would be put in prison if he defends anything else than the ‘dogma’ (the 
received wisdom). Such pressure is not necessarily taking away creativity, or so I 
argued, but it can take it away. How does the situation look like if creativity is in fact 
taken away? There is no creativity, and if there is no creativity, then there is no orig-
inality and/or no spontaneity. This follows from Sect. 1. The kind of freedom that 
Kekulé would thus have lacked in that counterfactual situation is often called the 
freedom to think differently. What is disabled is a critical stance toward the received 
wisdom.
I assume in the following that critical thinking is one realization of thinking inde-
pendently. It is thus one realization of the kind of independence that we have seen to 
be necessary for creativity. It follows that critical thinking is necessary for creativity, 
at least in all those situations where there is relevant previously acquired knowledge. 
Thinking creatively is thinking differently, which is thinking critically. This is con-
ceptually true as long as being critical means what I just assumed: thinking indepen-
dently. A mind that is truly critical is not just skeptical about something (since that’s 
rather easy); it is an independently thinking mind that is able to think things through 
in an independent manner in order to contribute to the production and preservation 
of knowledge. Thus, if the absence of academic freedom takes away creativity, then 
it does so since it takes away critical thinking. This, and not the potential conse-
quences (epistemic progress), is the core connection between academic freedom and 
creativity.
3.2  Augmenting the concept of academic freedom
With this we can also augment the concept of academic freedom, as standardly con-
ceived (i.e. as presented in Sect. 2). Academic freedom consists in a specific kind of 
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intellectual causal independence. If I think critically, I have used, as a matter of fact, 
my ability and right to do so, whatever the negative and positive enabling conditions 
of academic freedom. This means that a fully developed concept of academic free-
dom should refer to the causal independence of the mind explicitly, as the kind of 
freedom we mean when we talk about academic freedom. The causal independence 
of the mind is what needs to be protected with the negative and positive enabling 
conditions entailed in the standard account presented in Sect. 2.1.
It is very important to note, though, that critical thinking is just one realization 
of the freedom we mean when we talk about creativity and academic freedom. Even 
though academic freedom needs to allow for critical thinking, academic freedom 
is, after all, not the same as creativity or critical thinking. Academic freedom needs 
to be exercised with respect to old truths as well.20 Not all significant truths are 
new ones; sometimes protecting the already achieved wisdom from disappearing is 
equally (if not more) important than epistemic progress.
Take well-established truths that concern historical events. Is it a matter of 
defending academic freedom if we aim to protect the knowledge reached about the 
Holocaust, in the face of strategic Holocaust denials? Yes, it is. The causal inde-
pendence of the mind that is necessary for creativity is realized in such a case as 
an independence from strategic influences that try to lure society into the neglect 
of important truths (and for obvious political reasons). These influences can disa-
ble the collaborative knowledge production and preservation that we take academic 
freedom to protect. Hence, protecting these well-known, far from creative histori-
cal truths means using and defending academic freedom (protecting it from political 
influences), even if it can limit the free speech of individuals (in our case, Holocaust 
deniers).
Not just epistemic progress is at risk when academic freedom is at issue. If politi-
cal and other strategies interfere too much with academic affairs, the very institu-
tion of academic research is at peril, not just the epistemic progress it produces, 
as Polanyi already mentioned. Knowledge – whether old or new – is valuable and 
vulnerable, and as knowledge it needs protecting. Academic researchers inherit the 
respective protection from the knowledge to be protected, but only in so far as they 
are in the serious and independent business of academic knowledge production and 
preservation.
It follows that if we augment the concept of academic freedom with an explicit 
reference to the causal independence of the mind, we have utilized that creativity 
(and with it progress) and academic freedom require at its core the same kind of 
freedom. Since that is a tighter connection than what the weak progressivist correla-
tion discussed in Sect. 2.5 can offer, I take this augmented account to better fit the 
20 Thanks to an anonymous referee for reminding me about this point.
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frequent intuition that there is a tight connection between creativity and academic 
freedom.
How to spell out that augmentation in detail has to wait for another occasion. It is 
clear that the kind of causal independence that I specified in this contribution relates 
to what is often called objectivity. But bringing in the details on that core epistemo-
logical concept would lead us too far away, given that the focus here is on the con-
nection between creativity and academic freedom.21 What needs to be done in the 
future is to analyze how the kind of independence of the mind that we call academic 
freedom relates to the kind of independence of the mind that is often called objectiv-
ity. To understand that is important, not only to spell out the causal independence 
account presented here, but also to show why protecting academic freedom means 
to criticize (rather than to protect) strategic denials of empirically well-grounded 
truths. It is one of the absurdities of our time that academic freedom is increasingly 
often (ab)used by those who strategically deny well-confirmed scientific knowledge, 
for often quite evident political reasons (e.g. take as a historically well-documented 
case climate skepticism and the political and economic interests that fuel it).22 Using 
and defending academic freedom can mean protecting important established truths 
from disappearance if wrongfully attacked, as it can mean protecting the production 
of new truths. The function of academia is not only to disseminate and to advance 
knowledge; academia is, in its utmost core, the powerhouse of knowledge protec-
tion, committed strictly and exclusively to academic standards, restricted only by 
general ethical and political principles (e.g. limits on experimentation with humans, 
orientation at the common good, a duty to further human rights).
3.3  What follows: A non‑progressivist defense and a better progressivist defense
Given what I said so far, two vistas are open:
a) A non-progressivist epistemic defense of academic freedom: Given that old truths 
also deserve protection, the core value of academic freedom is independent of any 
considerations of progress but intimately connected with creativity since it refers 
to the same kind of causal independence of the mind. In other words, the causal 
independence account presented here opens up a way to an epistemic argument 
for academic freedom that is completely independent of considerations about 
progress since it does not only look at novelty and progress, but also at the ‘here 
and now.’ Such a non-progressivist justification for academic freedom can more 
easily accommodate the view that old truths need to be protected as well. The 
project of elucidating such a non-progressivist epistemic defense of academic 
freedom, however, goes beyond the scope of this contribution. Here, my goal is 
to depict the connection between creativity and academic freedom independently 
of progressivist thoughts. The core point in that respect is that the notion of an 
21 See Reutlinger (2021) instead, for an account of objectivity that also uses the concept of independ-
ence.
22 See Oreskes and Conway (2010)’s very accessible summary of the case.
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independent mind is the common core of the concept of creativity and a suitably 
augmented concept of academic freedom.
b) A limited but defensible version of the progressivist justification. This common 
core can also be used to improve the progressivist justification. After all, we now 
have a necessary condition for creative thinking in place, independent critical 
thinking, and with that a necessary condition for the innovation and progress 
that follows from it, resulting in a revised progressivist justification for academic 
freedom. As mentioned, I am certainly not the first one who connects critical 
thinking and academic freedom. Dworkin (1998), Andreescu (2009) or Wilholt 
(2012), for instance, also mention critical thinking with respect to academic free-
dom, but they fail to discuss its epistemological importance in a way that simul-
taneously allows to see its conceptual connection to creativity. In addition, they 
mainly discuss critical thinking with respect to its ethical or political importance 
(i.e. for the argument from autonomy or the argument from democracy). Critical 
thinking’s epistemic relevance shows up with respect to Mill’s claims about the 
above-mentioned asymmetry or his and also recent claims about the related value 
of diversity of thought, as in Wilholt (2012). But the connection to creativity is 
nonetheless ignored since the focus is on the consequences of diversity, not on 
how it originates (not surprising, given that Mill was a consequentialist). Yet, the 
independence account of creativity and academic freedom presented here allows 
bringing into view the wider epistemological relevance of independent thinking. 
After all, creativity explains the origin of diverse ideas, not just the consequence 
of diversity in ideas. In addition, bringing critical thinking into the progressivist 
picture also shows that the epistemological side of academic freedom is deeply 
connected with its political side, since independent thinking is important for both: 
progress regarding truth and progress in democracy.
Last but far from least, independent thinking is what non-democratic authorities 
are unisono afraid of, when they attack academic freedom in order to abuse institu-
tions of knowledge production and preservation (research and education) in order to 
achieve their kind of epistemic progress. This, finally, allows me to clarify why all 
of the above matters not just epistemologically but also politically.
3.4  Why that all matters politically
Progress is not easy to define, and it can be the handmaiden of all kinds of political 
regimes – authoritarian regimes, in particular. For instance, since roughly 2017, the Hun-
garian government launched several attacks against academic freedom. When it declared 
gender studies to be an illegal degree program in Hungarian higher education (in August 
2018), a progressivist justification was put to use (even though not always explicitly). 
Humanities, arts and sciences need to function in an efficient manner, meeting the “real 
social and labor market needs,” was the assumption, as the journalist Serdült (2018) 
reports. With respect to the “labor market needs” the Hungarian government stated that 
gender studies can only produce unemployment; with respect to the alleged “real social” 
needs it simply pointed to its conservative values and outlook for the Hungarian people. 
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According to the government, Hungarian research and education should help furthering 
the Hungarian people’s wellbeing, and gender studies, they claimed, fails to do so.
Epistemic progress for the Hungarian government, it seems, is progress regard-
ing truths about heteronormative families as the nucleus of society. After all, the 
Hungarian government created a new MA program in family studies to replace gen-
der studies, as the journalist Szikra (2018) reports. Truths about the diversity and 
contingency of gender roles, sex or sexuality seem to be regarded as irrelevant or 
even harmful. Already in 2017, the Secretary of State of the Ministry of Human 
Resources, Bence Rétvári, was very explicit about the Hungarian government’s 
negative attitude toward gender studies. For him, it “contrasts with everything the 
government’s world of values says about humans.” (Rétvári, 2017, quoted in HVG, a 
weekly print and online daily news outlet).23 These were among the arguments used.
If epistemic progress is defined the way the Hungarian government seems to do, 
and academic freedom is justified via that epistemic progress alone, without refer-
ence to the independence of academic research, what is actually protected is quite 
biased, and far from the openness that those defending the progressivist justifica-
tion originally had in mind. A progressivist line of defending academic freedom that 
leaves out reference to critical thinking as a fundamental freedom (a causal inde-
pendence of the mind) is thus politically, i.e. in practice, quite vulnerable, since 
then it all depends on the kind of epistemic progress and the values and wellbeing 
assumed since they determine what matters, i.e. which truths should be sought for.24
Thus, the moment the value of independence, and thus dissent, is left out in 
an account of academic freedom, the latter will go with the former, as part of the 
decisions for the kind of social and epistemic progress that the respective political 
regime deems to be in their service. Without reference to independence, academic 
freedom can too easily become a victim of what Dworkin (1998: 189) has called 
“cultures of conformity”, characterized by a “totalitarian epistemology”, in which.
“truth is not collected person by person, in acts of independent conviction, 
but is embedded in monolithic traditions or the fiats of priesthood or junta or 
majority vote, and dissent from that truth is treason. That totalitarian episte-
mology – searingly identified in the finally successful campaign of Orwell’s 
dictator to make his victim believe, through torture, that 2 + 2 = 5 – is tyr-
anny’s most frightening feature.”
Contemporary authoritarian regimes (such as Viktor Orbán’s “illiberal democracy” in 
Hungary) do not even need torture to achieve such ends. Cutting funds for public schools, 
public universities, arts and culture and civil organizations (e.g. NGOs), together with 
abuse of legal means to regulate media, education, research and civil organizations, sim-
ple closure or restructuring of institutions that do not ‘fit in’, abuse of social media and 
23 In Hungarian: “A szak tartalma szemben áll mindazzal, amit a kormány értékvilága az emberről vall.” 
(translation László Kőszeghy).
24 I am not arguing from the perspective of value-freedom. I rather argue that it is important to always 
include one specific epistemic and social value: independence of thought.
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(last but not least) simple, old-fashioned propaganda and corruption seem to be sufficient, 
to bend (or drive abroad) – first the people, and then the truths.
Only if the concept of academic freedom entails a reference to the causal independ-
ence of the mind that allows for knowledge production and preservation to happen 
in an adequate manner can one protect the academic world even in a case in which 
a government unduly tries to limit academic freedom in the name of progress. Such 
an augmented concept of academic freedom allows for a non-progressivist defense 
of it so that old truths are protected too. Since the reference to independence entails 
a reference to the pluralities and diversities usually cherished under the banner of a 
social democracy it also allows for an intrinsic connection between the argument from 
democracy and the argument from truth, a connection between the ethics and the epis-
temology of the kind of knowledge production and preservation that we still call ‘aca-
demic’ – and for a reason, since it stands for a critical and simultaneously constructive 
and disciplined freedom, a freedom that is at the core of creativity, academic freedom 
and an open, just and democratic society.
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